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A New Naval Warfare Paradigm
“A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.” – President Theodore Roosevelt’s State of the Union address, 1902
Just as has happened many times in centuries past, new technologies are upending naval warfare strategies and tactics. The history of naval warfare strategy stretches through centuries of technological innovation, tactical evolutions, and strategic policy shifts. This evolution has been punctuated by landmark developments in ship design, weaponry, and communications, leading up to the contemporary era where drones and other cutting-edge technologies are now setting the stage for the next chapter.
Naval warfare’s roots go back to antiquity, with early strategies emphasizing the importance of ramming and boarding actions. The arrival of gunpowder in the late Middle Ages revolutionized naval engagements, shifting the focus towards artillery dominance. This transformation laid the groundwork for the “Age of Sail”, where European powers competed for global dominance through fleets of galleons and frigates, engaging in battles that relied heavily on broadside cannonades and the intricate maneuvering of ships. The Industrial Revolution brought about another seismic shift with the introduction of steam power, ironclad warships, and later, steel battleships. These technological advancements made wind-powered naval fleets obsolete and ushered in an era of naval warfare dominated by battleships, which epitomized national power and strategic deterrence up until the mid-20th century. The strategies of this period, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan’s principles of sea power, emphasized fleet concentration in home waters and the acquisition of naval bases.
World War II marked a pivotal moment in naval warfare with the rise of aircraft carriers, which supplanted battleships as the principal capital ships of naval fleets. Carrier-based air power redefined naval engagements, enabling strikes over vast distances and introducing the concept of air superiority at sea. Submarines became critical as well, as fleet scouts and attack vessels capable of sinking capital ships and choking off an enemy’s commerce through unrestricted warfare. In the post-World War II era, especially with onset of the Cold War, the United States Navy emerged as the preeminent global naval power, focusing on carrier strike groups, nuclear-powered submarines, and the projection of power ashore. Strategies evolved to ensure command of the seas, undersea warfare, and power projection. What we are seeing today across maritime conflicts in the Red Sea/Suez Canal and Black Sea is the beginnings of yet another tidal shift in naval warfare. In April ‘22, the Ukrainians sunk the cruiser Moskva (the “flagship of the Black Sea Fleet”), the largest Russian warship to be sunk since WWII, with a combination of drones (for targeting) and cruise missiles. This combination of cruise missiles, aerial drones, and unmanned vessels (i.e. sea drones), has proven to be lethal. So far, the Ukrainians have sunk or severely damaged ~1/3 of the pre-war Russian fleet. Most recently, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has lost three vessels (ex. the Sergey Kotov on March 5th) from Ukraine’s drone swarm attacks. These technologies enhance situational awareness, extend operational reach, and importantly, introduce new tactics for asymmetric warfare and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies:
“This leads us to perhaps the most important lesson of the Black Sea conflict: surface ships — destroyers, cruisers, even massive American aircraft carriers — are now very vulnerable to nimble unmanned assaults. It may not take a true capital warship to sink another: The old kids’ game of Battleship may need to remake itself and add naval drones to the mix.” – James Stavridis, Retired US Navy Admiral, and former supreme allied commander of NATO
The US Navy and NATO have already begun adapting by employing additional lookouts, additional weapons teams to engage small-craft, and providing additional air coverage for detecting drones. In the Red Sea, US warships have been relatively effective against Houthi missiles attacks, but it’s a costly affair. The navy’s air-defense missiles (ex. SM-2) cost over $2mm each. Oftentimes they fire two at each drone or other target. That’s a $4mm countermeasure against a drone that can cost as little as $1k. Clearly, more cost-effective air defense systems are needed (and are already in development). Some have suggested that the adoption of drones today are like the adoption of machine guns during WWI:
The adoption of the machine gun is an apt analogy for the integration of small unmanned aerial systems in the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. military. As with the adoption of the machine gun, failure of vision, traditionalism, and bureaucratic resistance are leading to insufficient numbers and delayed force modernization. Despite observing small drones proliferate globally and their growing use on modern battlefields, the U.S. military has still not equipped its infantry with adequate numbers or pushed ownership of these systems low enough to have an impact.
There are other dynamics at play as well that, while not new threats, are highlighting how vulnerable global infrastructure is during maritime conflict. Not only have global shipping routes been disrupted in the Suez Canal, but this past week three internet/telecom cables under the Red Sea were cut, which affected 25% of the data traffic flowing through the Red Sea. The point is that the US Navy and its allies need new capabilities to defend against these threats, especially in the context of asymmetric warfare. Our focus is on the software that is under development to support modernization. Efforts have been underway for several years now across the military as recognition grew that resources were not being properly allocated:
According to the Consortium for Information and Software Quality (CISQ), in 2020 the United States wasted $2.08 trillion on bad software and its effects—nearly 10 percent of U.S. gross domestic product! The naval services’ estimated budget for fiscal year 2021 is about $207 billion, suggesting the Sea Services may lose $20 billion in 2021 to the effects of bad software… The Navy’s response to this crisis has been to embrace and implement Development Secure Operations (DevSecOps).
A few years ago, the DoD released its software modernization strategy. One initiative that we’re watching closely is the Overmatch Software Armory (OSA), a Navy DevSecOps Ecosystem designed to support accelerated application development. OSA comprises tools, Agile Core Services, Collaborative Staging Environments, and an Application Arsenal, leveraging a continuous cyber accreditation process known as Rapid Assess and Incorporate Software Engineering (RAISE). The goal is to reduce the time it takes to receive an Authority to Operate (ATO), facilitating quicker development to deployment cycles while ensuring high security and product quality standards. Additionally, in 2022 the DoD requested $874mm specifically for AI spending. Anduril has become of the leading defense tech companies, especially for autonomous warfare. But there are adjacent early stage software opportunities here as well. For example, we recently met with one company building AI-powered military and intelligence training and war game software for the DoD. Another is building predictive maintenance systems for vehicles (manned or unmanned) and incorporating inventory and personnel availability to optimize maintenance workflows. There are a host of supporting software systems like these that the DoD will need if they want to successfully adapt their tactics to the new maritime warfare environment that is unfolding today.
The integration of drones and autonomous systems (and systems to defend against them) into naval warfare strategy has many challenges. For example, questions about command and control, cybersecurity, and rules of engagement in an era of autonomous warfare are still being addressed. We expect the evolution of naval warfare strategy in the face of drones and new technologies to be a gradual process. Traditional platforms like aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface combatants remain central to naval power projection, even as they adapt to incorporate and support unmanned systems. Still, there will be many opportunities emerging to support the Navy and DoD as they adopt to a rapidly changing maritime environment.